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Limbaugh: Limbaugh: Life Insurance As Security for a Debt

Life Insurance as Security for a Debt and the
Applicability of the Rule Against Wager
Contracts
Estate ofBean v. Hazel'
I. INTRODUCTION

Every jurisdiction has a rule against wager contracts, developed to
discourage speculation in human life and attendant moral hazard.2 In the life
insurance context, the rule in Missouri prohibiting wager contracts applies only
"where a policy is taken out by, and premiums paid by, a person who has no
insurable interest in the life of the insured, or when a policy has been assigned
for speculative purposes." 3
The Missouri Supreme Court, in Estate ofBean v. Hazel, correctly limited
the creditor's recovery on the debtor's life insurance policy to the amount of the
debt, plus interest. However, in doing so, the court disregarded precedent set in
Butterworth by holding that the rule against wager contracts applies even when
the insured takes out the life insurance policy and pays the premiums.
Application of the rule to these facts does not promote the primary purposes
of the rule and does not produce instability in the insured's right to designate
whomever she pleases as beneficiary, irrespective of the beneficiary's insurable
interest, or lack thereof.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 7, 1990, Jerry N. Bean (Bean) borrowed $120,000 from Ernest
Hazel, Ill, (Hazel).4 The agreement was embodied in a promissory note
obligating Bean to repay Hazel in monthly installments of $2,609.09.' One
condition of the agreement was that Bean was to purchase and maintain a life
insurance policy naming Hazel as beneficiary in an 6amount not less than the
unpaid balance on the promissory note, plus interest.

1. 972 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1998).
2. Moral hazard is the temptation, created by potential financial benefit, for the
beneficiary of an insurance policy to destroy the insured person or property. See
generally ROBERT H. JERRY, III, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 254 (2d ed. 1996);

Tom Baker, On The Genealogy ofMoral Hazard,75 TEx. L. REv. 237 (1996) (discussing
the origin of the doctrine of moral hazard in the insurance industry and the application
of the doctrine outside the traditional purview of insurance, specifically, economics).
3. Butterworth v. Mississippi Valley Trust, 240 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Mo. 1951).
4. Bean, 972 S.W.2d at 291.
5. Id.
Estate
of Beanofv.Missouri
Hazel, 972
S.W.2d
290, Scholarship
291 (Mo. 1998).
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On July 26, 1990, Bean validly executed a change of beneficiary form on
an existing life insurance policy, naming Hazel as beneficiary to policy proceeds
in the amount of $120,000. 7 Bean never changed Hazel's beneficiary status and
died on September 6, 1992, owing Hazel $79,795.71.8 Hazel sought and
received the designated $120,000 of policy proceeds from the issuer of Bean's
life insurance policy.9
Bean's estate (Estate), in accordance with Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 473.340,"O subsequently filed a petition for the discovery of assets in
probate court seeking to determine title and right to possession of the $120,000

7. Id. The policy provided $200,000 in total proceeds. Id.
8. Id. Bean borrowed an additional $12,000 from Hazel on February 17, 1992.
This loan is reflected in the unpaid balance. Id.
9. Id.
10. Mo. REv. STAT. §47.340 (1994). The statute provides:
Discovery of assets, procedure for[:]
1. Any personal representative, administrator, creditor, beneficiary or other
person who claims an interest in property which is claimed to be an asset of
an estate or which is claimed should be an asset of an estate may file a
verified petition in the probate division of the circuit court in which said
estate is pending seeking determination of the title, or right to possession
thereto, or both. The petition shall describe the property, if known, shall
allege the nature of the interest of the petitioner and that title or possession of
the property, or both, are being adversely withheld or claimed. The court may
order the joinder, as a party, of any person who may claim an interest in or
who may have possession of any such property.
2. Service of summons, petition and answer thereto together with all
subsequent proceedings shall be governed by the Missouri Rules of Civil
Procedure. Any party may demand a jury trial.
3. Upon a trial of the issues, the court shall determine the persons who have
an interest in said property together with the nature and extent of any such
interest. The court shall direct the delivery or transfer of the title or
possession, or both, of said property to the person or persons entitled thereto
and may attach the person of any party refusing to make delivery as directed.
If the party found to have adversely withheld the title or possession, or both,
of said property has transferred or otherwise disposed of the same, the court
shall render a money judgment for the value thereof with interest thereon from
the date the property, or any interest therein, was adversely withheld. In
addition to a judgment for title and possession, or either, or for the value
thereof, the court may enter a judgment for all losses, expenses and damages
sustained, if any, but not including attorney fees, if it finds that the property
was wrongfully detained, transferred or otherwise disposed of.
4. If the court finds that a complete determination of the issues cannot be had
without the presence of other parties, the court may order them to be brought
in by an amended or supplemental petition. The court shall order the joinder
of the personal representative of the estate if he is not named as a party.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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in proceeds from Bean's life insurance policy." The trial court held that Hazel
was entitled to the contested assets and did not hold the excess policy proceeds
in trust for the Estate. 2 The Estate appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Eastern District of Missouri, which reversed the trial court's ruling. 3 The
Missouri Supreme Court then granted transfer. 4

On transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, Hazel contended he was
entitled to the proceeds in excess of the outstanding debt, citing favorable
authority from otherjurisdictions."5 The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed the trial court's ruling. 6 The court held that when a debtor names a
creditor as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy taken out and maintained by
the debtor and the creditor's policy proceeds are disproportionate to the
outstanding debt, the creditor is only entitled to policy proceeds in the amount
of the outstanding debt and holds the excess proceeds in trust for the debtor's
estate. 7
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to the Rule Against Wager Contracts
All jurisdictions have a rule against wager contracts. The Rule was
promulgated to discourage speculation in human life and eliminate an incentive
for the beneficiary of a life insurance policy to hasten the demise of the insured."
If a stranger takes out fire insurance on another's house, he will not lose any
money or be damaged in any way if the house bums down. Yet, if the house

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 293.
17. Estate of Bean V.Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290, 291-93 (Mo. 1998).
18. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 976 (1982); see also JANICE E. GREIDER & WILLIAM T.
BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 57 (3d ed. 1974).

In its basic outline, a life insurance contract obligates one party to pay another
a specific sum of money on the happening of an event that is presumably not
within the control of either. Such an agreement bears more than a passing
resemblance to a wager. It is obvious also that an unscrupulous person
standing to gain from the destruction of an insured piece of property or an
insured life might feel a strong temptation, under some circumstances, to
implement the whims of chance in his own favor. If life insurance contracts
were issued indiscriminately, therefore, they could pose a double threat to the
public welfare. To the evils attendant on gambling would be added the

possibility of creating a motive for murder in the minds of the unscrupulous.
Id.
See
JERRY,
noteSchool
2, at 233-36,
Published generally
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does happen to be destroyed in a fire, he receives the proceeds from the fire
insurance policy. This tends to create an incentive for the beneficiary to bum
down the house. Likewise, someone cannot purchase life insurance on a total
stranger, wagering that he will die before more is paid in premiums than the
policy pays off. This creates an incentive for the beneficiary to pay as little in
premiums as possible by killing the insured. The rule against wager contracts
seeks to eliminate this type of speculation and evil incentive. 9
To eliminate this speculation and evil incentive, it is universally held that
one must have an insurable interest in the life of the insured to take out and pay
for a life insurance policy on that person.20 An insurable interest can arise out
of a family, business, or financial relation.2' The Supreme Court defined an
insurable interest as some "reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit" from
the continued life of the insured.22 The expectation of continued benefit is
thought to be a sufficient deterrent to evil motive.23
Speculation and moral hazard can arise in cases where the beneficiary takes
out the policy on the insured, where the insured names a third party as
beneficiary, and where the insured takes out a policy and assigns the policy to
a third party. In all of these arrangements, motive for foul play is possible.
However, each of these transactions may be perfectly legitimate. The primary
purpose of the rule against wager contracts is to prevent speculation and
attendant moral hazard. 24 Thus, the court will examine the circumstances of the
transaction to determine if there is a speculative purpose; that is, whether the
25
transaction is "cover for a wager contract.,

19. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 976 (1982).
20. Id. See also GREIDER, supra note 18, at 57 ("These problems are avoided by
one legal requirement-the requirement of an insurable interest on the part of the person
who will benefit from a life insurance contract."); DAN M. MCGILL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
LIFE INSURANCE 51 (1959) ('The insurable interest requirement originated as a means of
controlling wagering in human lives and still finds its greatest significance in that
function, but it was also intended to reduce the threat of murder created by the insuring
of one person's life for the benefit of another.").
21. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 976 (1982).
22. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881). See BUIsT M. ANDERSON,
VANCE ON INSURANCE § 31, at 190 (3d ed. 1951) (hereinafter VANCE ON INSURANCE)
(defining insurable interest as "the policy of the law [which] requires that the assured
shall have an interest to preserve the life of the insured in spite of the insurance, rather
than to destroy it because of the insurance").
23. The expectation of benefit sufficient to create an insurable interest cannot be
satisfied by the expectation of the payment of the life insurance proceeds; otherwise,
there could be no rule against wager contracts.
24. See VANCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 22, § 31, at 190 (stating that "[t]he
essential thing is that the policy shall be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose
of speculating upon the hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest") (quoting
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876)).
25. See WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE §92, at 381
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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A colorful application of the rule against wager contracts is found in Lakin

v. PostalLifeInsuranceCo. 26 Henry Lakin (Lakin) ran a small roofing business
and placed an advertisement in the Kansas City Star for a single man, aged 25
to 30, to work as a helper for room and board and wages.27

W. Harvey

Hankinson (Hankinson) answered the advertisement, began working for Lakin
as a helper, and lived in Lakin's home.28 Only seven days after the
advertisement was placed, Lakin approached an insurance agent stating he had
a new "partner" and that he wanted his new partner to take out a life insurance
policy naming Lakin as beneficiary. 29 Lakin had some initial trouble persuading
a life insurance company to issue a policy on Hankinson; 30 however, Hankinson
eventually took out a term life insurance policy providing twenty-five thousand
dollars in death benefits." The policy paid twice that amount in the event of
accidental death of the insured. Lakin paid the premium on the life insurance
policy.32 Although Hankinson initially named his wife as a beneficiary,33 he
later named Lakin as the beneficiary. 34 Less than two months later, Lakin killed
Hankinson while hunting.35 Lakin claimed that Hankinson tossed his gun to him
and in doing so "his finger must have hit the trigger."36 Hankinson died from a
gunshot wound to the chest.3 7 Postal Life Insurance Company (Postal Life), who
issued Hankinson's policy, denied Lakin's application for the proceeds and
Lakin filed suit.38 Postal Life maintained, inter alia,39 that Lakin had no insurable
interest in the life of Hankinson. 40 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, stating
that the mere designation of Hankinson as Lakin's partner, as dubious as it was
on these facts, 41 did not create an insurable interest in Lakin on the life of

(5th ed. 1952)(hereinafter RICHARDS ON INSURANCE) (stating that "where the insured is
merely a nominal party whose life and name are used to cover a scheme to obtain
speculative insurance, the courts will invalidate the life insurance policy as violative of

public policy").
26. 316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958).
27. Id. at 544.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 546.
30. Id.
31. Lakin v. Postal Life Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Mo. 1958).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 547.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 548.
36. Lakin v. Postal Life Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Mo. 1958).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 544.
39. Postal Life also maintained that Lakin intentionally killed Hankinson. Id.

40. Id.
41. There was no evidence that Hankinson was a partner in Lakin's business, other
542, 551
Life Ins. Co., Repository,
316 S.W.2d 1999
Lakin v.
statements of
to that
effect.School
than
Lakin's
Published by University
Missouri
ofPostal
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Hankinson. 42 "A person cannot take out a valid and enforceable policy of
insurance for his own benefit on the life of a person in which he has no insurable

on the
interest; such a policy or contract of insurance is void and unenforceable
43
grounds of public policy, it being merely a wager contract."

B. The Rule Against Wager Contracts in a Creditor-Debtor
Relationship
When a life insurance policy is used as security for a debt, it is uniformly
held that a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor.44 A creditor
can receive proceeds from a debtor's life insurance policy in a variety of ways.
She can be named the beneficiary of her debtor's life insurance policy, or she
can be assigned the policy. She can also take out a life insurance policy on the
life of her debtor. Jurisdictions accommodate these distinctions differently, with
sometimes dispositive results. The legal scrutiny paid upon the beneficiary is
greater when the beneficiary takes out the life insurance policy on the insured.
This is because it is the classic circumstance that gave rise to the insurable
interest requirement, and consequently to the rule against wager contracts.45
That is not to say that courts will not look into the circumstances surrounding a
designation, by the insured, of a beneficiary who has no insurable interest when
the evidence so warrants. 6 It is just that the first two scenarios are closer to the
fact patterns that gave rise to the insurable interest doctrine, and thus, these
situations will more likely alert judicial antennae to possible speculative
must be taken
purposes. The overarching principle in all cases is that the policy
47
out in good faith and not as a subterfuge for a wager contract.
Almost without exception, however, the creditor pays or agrees to pay the
premiums on the debtor's policy; that is, the debtor does not maintain the
policy.48 This distinction is important and will be developed in the commentary

(Mo. 1958).
42. Id. at 550.
43. Id.
44. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 992 (1982); VANCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 22, § 32,
is well settled that a creditor has an insurable interest in the life
at 200 (stating that "[i]t
of his debtor").
45. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 251 (stating that "[w]here an individual takes out
insurance on the life of another, a greater risk exists that the evils to which the insurable
interest is directed-destruction of the insured and wagering-will occur").
46. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 251 (stating "[f]or the court to take this step, the
beneficiary must lack an interest, either economic or familial, in the life of the insured").
47. See VANCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 22, § 31, at 190.
48. But see Sachs v. United States, 412 F.2d 357, 365 n.5 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating
that "[i]t is immaterial whether the debtor or creditor pays the premiums and even
whether the debtor knows about the life insurance contract") (citing Morrow v. National
Life,
168 S.W. 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914)). The Morrow court stated the policy was valid
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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below. Problems arise when the policy proceeds going to the creditor exceed the
amount of the debt. Whether the creditor's recovery on the debtor's life
insurance policy is limited to the amount of the debt becomes the issue.
Three solutions have evolved in response to this issue. First, some
jurisdictions limit the creditor's recovery, per se, to the amount of the debt, plus
premiums paid, plus interest. 49 Second, some jurisdictions allow a creditor to
recover the full amount of the policy proceeds, if the proceeds are not grossly
disproportionate to the debt.50 Third, some jurisdictions allow a creditor full
recovery, absent evidence of speculation or proof of contrary intent on the part
of the debtor.5 '
Jurisdictions limiting recovery of a creditor to the amount of the debt, plus
premiums paid, plus interest, state that a creditor has an insurable interest in her
debtor's life only to the extent of the debt. 2 Any assurance over this amount is
mere speculation. 3 In these jurisdictions, however, the entire policy is not void
and unenforceable because of this perceived speculative purpose.5 4 The portion
of the policy necessary to satisfy the debt, plus premiums, plus interest is valid

as to the creditor.5 5 The balance is valid and is held in trust for the debtor's

when taken out and paid for by either the insured or the creditor. Morrow, 168 S.W.2d
at 883. However, the court later stated the beneficiary must possess an insurable interest
in the life of the insured, as per statute § 6956 R.S. 1909. Id. at 882. The court then
reasoned that because the statute required the beneficiary to have an insurable interest,
the rule against wager contracts was applicable irrespective of who paid the premiums.
Id. at 883. Today, there is no statute in Missouri requiring the beneficiary to have an
insurable interest in the life of the insured. Therefore, the foundation for the decision in
Sachs is unsound, making the holding suspect.
49. See Wamock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881); Sachs v. United States, 412 F.2d
357 (8th Cir. 1969); Jimenez v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App.4th 528 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); Progressive Life Ins. Co. v. Bohannon, 40 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946);
Morrow v. National Life, 168 S.W. 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914); Strode v. Meyer Bros.
Drug Co., 74 S.W. 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903); Froiland v. Tritle, 484 N.W.2d 310 (S.D.
1992); Burnett v. Amicable Life Ins. Co., 195 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1946).
50. See Amick v. Butler, 12 N.E. 518 (Ind. 1887); Lakin v. Postal Life Ins. Co.,
316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958); see also 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 992, at n.53.
51. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); New York Life v. Baum, 700
F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1983); American Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1964);
Zolintakis v. Orfanos, 119 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1941); Graves v. Norred, 510 So. 2d 816
(Ala. 1987); Lewellyn v. Dobson Bros., 262 S.E.2d 726 (S.C. 1980); Hackney v. Sharp,
157 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. 1942).
52. See e.g., Strode v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 74 S.W. 379, 381 (Mo. Ct. App.
1903).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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estate. 6 Thus, there is no net benefit to the creditor upon the death of the debtor,
eliminating any speculation or evil incentive.
In Strode v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co.,5 7 John Stokes (Stokes) owed Meyer
Brothers Drug Co. (Meyer Drug) $111 as a business debt. 8 Stokes, at the
suggestion of Meyer Drug, took out a five thousand dollar life insurance policy
and named Meyer Drug beneficiary in the amount of $4950 with $50 going to
his estate. 9 Meyer Drug paid all the premiums until Stokes died three years
later." Meyer Drug refused to pay the estate any portion of the designated
proceeds."' The court determined that the policy was taken out as security for
the debt owed.6 2 Consequently, the court held that "the creditor.., acquires the
status of beneficiary as far as is necessary to make him whole and no further. As
to the remainder
of the insurance money, he stands as trustee for the estate of the
63
insured.,

Jurisdictions allowing a creditor to recover the full amount of the policy
proceeds when the difference between the proceeds and the debt is not grossly
disproportionate reason that a creditor should not lose money on the death of her
debtor? 4 The creditor should be allowed to assure the debtor in an amount
greater than the amount of the debt because the creditor pays the premiums and
interest. This allows the creditor a greater opportunity to avoid a loss upon the
debtor's death. 65 The critical question under this formulation of the rule is

56. Id.

57. Strode v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 74 S.W. 379, 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Strode v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 74 S.W. 379, 380-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903).
63. Id. at 381. The court acknowledged that some jurisdictions do not limit a
creditor's recovery on the debtor's life insurance policy when the difference between the
debt and the proceeds is not "unreasonable." Id. The court found, however, that the
"egregious disproportion" between the debt and the proceeds prohibit Meyer Drug from
receiving the designated policy proceeds. Id.
64. See e.g., Amick v. Butler, 12 N.E. 518 (Ind. 1887).
65. See MCGILL, supra note 20, at 64 (stating that this rule is "largely due to the
notion that a creditor should be allowed to insure the debtor's life for a sum estimated to
be sufficient to reimburse the creditor, at the debtor's death, for premiums paid on the
policy, with interest thereon, plus the debt and accumulated interest"). However, this
rule has been severely criticized as engendering "practical embarrassment" because:
[T]he validity of the contract should be determined according to the motives
of the parties and the contract viewed at its date, rather than after the death of
the insured... [and because] the total of the premium, as thus computed
[based on the life expectancy of the insured] with interest thereon, will

generally exceed the face amount of the policy, no matter how large or how
small the amount of the insurance, leaving to the creditor nothing at all to
apply upon the debt. [Further] to permit the creditor to take out insurance,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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whether the disproportion indicates that the policy was taken out as a wager; the
greater the disproportion, the greater the suggestion that the policy was taken out
for a speculative purpose.66
In Amick v. Butler,67 Frazee owed Amick six hundred dollars. At Amick's
suggestion, Frazee took out a two thousand dollar life insurance policy on
himself and named Amick as beneficiary.68 Amick agreed to pay all the
premiums. 69 Frazee died approximately two years after the policy was taken
out. 70 Deducting the amount of the debt and the premium payments, $1259 of
policy proceeds remained, which Amick refused to pay to Frazee's
administrator, Butler. " The court held:
[A] creditor may in good faith take insurance upon the life of his
debtor, either by procuring a policy in which he is designated as the
beneficiary, or by assignment... the amount of the insurance obtained
must bear some just proportion to the debt ...

and the probable

contingencies attending the future maintenance of the policy. The
circumstances must be such as not to raise the presumption that the
transaction on its face was a mere speculation.72
Having determined that the policy was taken out in good faith and did not
feature characteristics of "mere speculation," the court found Amick obtained a
vested right to collect the full amount of the policy proceeds. 73 Even though
there was an oral agreement that Amick would return the policy to Frazee if the
debt and the premiums on the policy were paid, 74 the court determined this was
not enough to create a trust for Frazee's estate.75

greatly in excess of the debt, offers a clear inducement to the creditor to
shorten the debtor's life, and therefore, contravenes a recognized principle of
public policy.
RICHARDS ON INSURANCE, supra note 25, § 98, at 397. See also VANCE ON INSURANCE,
supra note 22, § 32, at 200 (stating a similar criticism).
66. See GREIDER, supra note 18, at 131 (stating "if the insurance is unreasonably
high in relation to the amount of the debt, the facts themselves suggest that the
transaction is in reality a wager").
67. 12 N.E. 518 (Ind. 1887).
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Amick v. Butler, 12 N.E. 518, 520 (Ind. 1887).
73. Id. at521.
74. Id. at 518.
75. Id. at 521. Interestingly, the court stated that when the policy is a security for
the debt and the debtor maintains the policy, any excess proceeds are to be held in trust

for the debtor's estate, irrespective of the designation of the creditor as beneficiary in the

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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In jurisdictions allowing a creditor to recover the full amount of the policy

proceeds, absent speculative purpose or contrary intent of the debtor, the
designation of the beneficiary for the full policy proceeds is presumed to be the
insured's overriding intent.76 In American Casualty Co. v. Rose, "Verl Rose
(Rose) took out and paid for a thirty day life insurance policy paying fifty
thousand dollars in the event of an accidental death.78 Rose, an automobile stunt
' named his employer, John
performer in "Auto Thrill Circus,"79
King (King), the
0
beneficiary of the policy." There was evidence that Rose owed King one or two
thousand dollars. 8' The court first stated that Rose had an insurable interest in
his own life and was free to name anyone as beneficiary, irrespective of the
beneficiary's insurable interest, or lack thereof.82 Further, the court determined
that King was named the beneficiary "without limitation" and that a creditordebtor relationship creates no presumption that the debtor intended to limit the
creditor's recovery on the life insurance policy. The court, citing Zolitakis v.
Orfanos,8 4 stated that a trust can be created by an express or implicit
understanding of the parties that the excess proceeds of a policy, assigned as
security for a debt, will be held for the debtor's estate. 85 However, the debtor's
estate has the burden of proving by "clear and unmistakable proof' that it was
the debtor's intent to limit the creditor's recovery on the policy to the amount of
the debt.86
C. The Rule FavoringFree Designationof a Beneficiary
Finally, as noted in the preceding case, it is universally held that a person
has an insurable interest in his own life and is free, in the absence of statute, to
designate whomever he pleases as the beneficiary, irrespective of the
beneficiary's insurable interest, or lack thereof, in the life of the insured. 87 The

life insurance policy. Id. at 520.
76. See, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1964).
77. 340 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1964).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 470.
80. Id. at 469-70.
81. Id. at 470.
82. American Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469, 471 (10th Cir. 1964).
83. Id.

84. 119 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1941).
85. American Cas. Co., 340 F.2d at 471.
86. Id.
87. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 974 (1982); ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAW § 3.5(a), at 120 (1971) (stating that the "assertion that 'every person has
an insurable interest in his own life' is a fictional way of saying that, despite the
applicability of an insurable interest doctrine to life insurance contracts, every person sui
juris...
may validly contract for insurance on his own life, designating whomever he
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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only exception is that the policy is void if the designation of the beneficiary is
merely "cover for a wager contract.",88 This policy gives effect to the grantor's
intent and prevents the insurer from attempting to escape liability on a valid
insurance contract by asserting that the named beneficiary lacks an insurable
interest in the life of the insured. 9

will as beneficiary"); see also VANCE ON INSURANCE, supranote 22, § 31, at 188, which

states:
It is more accurate to say that the question of insurable interest is immaterial
when the policy is on the insured's own life. The presence of an insurable
interest is really required only as evidence of the good faith of the parties, and
it is contrary to human experience that a man should insure his own life for
the purpose of speculation, or be tempted to take his own life in order to
secure payment ofmoney to some other, although instances of such gruesome
fraud upon insurers is not wanting. Consequently, it is held that the mere fact
that a man of his own motion insures his life for the benefit either of himself
or of another is sufficient evidence of good faith to validate the contract.
88. 43 AM. JUR. 2D § 974 (1982).
89. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, 700 F.2d 928, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1983).
In some jurisdictions it is held that only an insurer can assert that the beneficiary or
assignee lacks an insurable interest in the life of the insured. This rule is "derived from
the notion that only a party to a contract should have standing to raise an issue that might
void the contract." JERRY, supranote 2, at 265. In Missouri, ostensibly only the insurer
can raise lack of insurable interest. Lowe v. Rennert, 869 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993). The court in Lowe, however, allowed the insured to assert the beneficiary's
lack of insurable interest in the insured's life. Id. The issue of standing was not raised
in Bean, however, the court allowed the Estate to question Hazel's insurable interest.

This may be because the Estate was also a beneficiary of the life insurance policy at

issue, therefore giving the Estate privity that may satisfy the contractual rationale of the
rule. If the Estate had not been a beneficiary also, the standing issue may have become
central. Nonetheless, the continued validity of the rule in Missouri is suspect.
Authorities on insurance law have also reached different results interpreting the majority
view on the use of this "standing" rule. See KEETON, supra note 86, § 3.3(b), at 103-04
(stating the majority view is that only the insurer may assert lack of insurable interest, yet
noting due to its inconsistent application, "it seems doubtful indeed that it represents the
prevailing view"); JERRY, supra note 2, at 265 (stating that "[m]ost courts adhere to the
view that only an insurer has standing to raise the absence of insurable interest" but
"some courts have simply overlooked the rule"). But see RICHARDS ON INSURANCE,
supra note 25, § 89, at 372 (stating "the great weight of authority in the United States"
allows third parties to assert lack of insurable interest).
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority first determined whether the rule against wager contracts was
applicable in the present case.9° Because there was a creditor-debtor relationship
between Bean and Hazel and because Hazel was designated beneficiary of
Bean's life insurance policy as security for the debt, the court analyzed the
circumstances to determine whether there was a speculative purpose that would
require application of the rule against wager contracts.9' The court found that the
policy proceeds to Hazel were "disproportionately large when compared
to the
92
debt," sufficient to be deemed an "improper speculative purpose.
Although the majority acknowledged that the rule against wager contracts
can conflict with the rule favoring an insured's free designation of a
beneficiary,93 the rule favoring free designation is applicable "provided it not be
done by way of cover for a wagering policy."94 However, because the proceeds
payable to Hazel were disproportionate to the debt, there was an improper
speculative purpose.95 Implicitly, if there was an improper speculative purpose,
the designation of beneficiary was "cover for a wagering policy." Consequently,
the rule favoring free designation of a beneficiary was overridden by the rule
against wager contracts.
The court then determined that "a constructive trust will be imposed where
a person wrongfully obtains the proceeds of a life insurance policy as beneficiary
of the policy."96 Because Hazel was not entitled to the excess proceeds, due to
the improper speculative purpose, he wrongfully obtained the excess proceeds.97
Therefore, the court found that Hazel held the excess proceeds in trust for the
Estate.98

90. Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (Mo. 1998).
91. Id. at 292.
92. Id. The court relies on Strode v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 74 S.W. 379 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1903) to arrive at the disproportion test. In Strode, however, the court did not apply
a disproportion test, but followed a "per se" test, holding that "the creditor ...acquires

the status of beneficiary as far as is necessary to make him whole and no further. As to
the remainder of the insurance money, he stands as trustee for the estate of the insured
."

Id. at 381.

93. "These two rules come into closest conflict where a creditor contracts with a
debtor to assign the proceeds of an insurance policy as a means of securing payment of
a debt and the proceeds of the policy are disproportionate to the amount owing on the
debt when the insured dies." Bean, 972 S.W.2d at 291-92.

94. Id. at 291.
95. Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. 1998).
96. Id. (quoting WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, ScOTr ON TRUSTS § 490 (4th ed. 1989).
97. Id. at 293.
98. Id. at 292.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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B. The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent found the rule against wager contracts inapplicable in the
present case. 99 "[T]he rule against wager life insurance contracts only 'applies
where a policy has been taken out by, and the premiums paid by, a person who
has no insurable interest in the life of the insured, or when it has been assigned
for speculative purposes."" Because Bean took out the policies and paid the
premiums, the dissent held that the rule against wager policies was
inapplicable.'' Further, the dissent found no evidence to suggest that Bean
named Hazel the beneficiary for speculative purposes.0 2 Because there was no
evidence of a speculative purpose, the dissent determined that Hazel was entitled
to recover the full amount of the policy proceeds.'0 3
V. COMMENT
Missouri precedent dictates that the rule against wager contracts applies
only "where a policy is taken out by, and premiums paid by, a person who has
no insurable interest in the life of the insured, or when it has been assigned for
speculative purposes."' "°4 The rule should not be applied when the insured
purchases and continues to maintain the life insurance policy because the
speculation and attendant moral hazard sought to be eliminated by the rule are
not present.
First, it is a dubious proposition that an insured can speculate against
himself. The speculation sought to be avoided by the rule is a third party
wagering that the insured will die, perhaps fortuitously, before the third party
pays more in premiums than the policy pays off. There is no wager or gamble
when an insured pays the premiums because the insured does not benefit. He
cannot win the "bet." If there is nothing to win, there is no gamble and, thus, no
speculative purpose.
Second, there is also no incentive to kill the insured. The insured's inherent
interest in self-preservation is presumably sufficient to keep him from
committing suicide for the benefit of his beneficiaries.0" Moreover, if a creditor

99. Id. at 293.
100. Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Mo. 1998) (quoting
Butterworth v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Mo. 1951).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 294.
103. Id. at 295.
104. Butterworth, 240 S.W.2d at 682.
105. See VANCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 22, § 31, at 188 (stating that "it is
contrary to human experience that a man.., be tempted to take his own life in order to
secure payment of money to some other").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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is designated as beneficiary, the creditor is very much interested in the continued
life of the insured, his debtor. The debtor can repay the debt and the creditor will
still receive the policy proceeds.'0 6 Some might counter that there is a possibility
that the creditor-beneficiary has an incentive to kill the insured to recover the
policy proceeds now. However, as Justice Holmes stated in Grigsby v. Russell,
"[tjhe law has no universal fear of the temptation opened by a pecuniary benefit
accruing upon a death."' °7
Further, the majority's application of the disproportion test is inappropriate.
The disproportion between the policy proceeds and the debt is allowed for the
very reason that the creditor pays the premiums.108 This enables the creditor to
better assure herself against the risk of loss on the death of her debtor.0 9 Thus,
when the insured pays the premiums, application of the disproportion test serves
no purpose. A limitation on the creditor's recovery from the debtor's life
insurance policy must be accomplished by other means.
Although the dissent correctly determined that the rule against wager
contracts was inapplicable in the present case," 0 it failed to consider the
insured's intent and the equities of the case." The better reasoned approach
would be to follow the jurisdictions that allow a creditor to recover the full
amount of the policy proceeds, absent speculative purpose or contrary intent of
the insured.
In Bean, there was no evidence that the transaction was cover for a wager
contract. The existence of a creditor-debtor relationship was uncontested. These
facts alone, however, should not limit the creditor's recovery. The contrary
intent of the insured must be shown. Evidence that the insured designated the

106. This presupposes that the debtor intended the creditor to receive the full
policy proceeds. This Note, however, proposes that the creditor is entitled to full
recovery so long as the intent of the debtor is not to the contrary. Therefore, whether the
creditor will recover the designated policy proceeds depends upon the circumstances of
the case. If it is proven that the insured intended to limit the creditor's recovery to the
outstanding debt, and the outstanding debt is nil, then the creditor recovers nothing on
the policy.
107. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1911). See also VANCE ON
INSURANCE, supra note 22, § 31, at 189, which states:
It is true that such a beneficiary without interest will be subject to the same
temptation to terminate unlawfully the life of the insured as if he himself had
taken out the policy.., but the law considers this danger too slight for notice,
since the selection of beneficiary by the insured is, in ordinary cases,
sufficient guaranty of the existence of such good faith and confidence
between them as will sufficiently protect the insured.
108. See supra note 65.
109. See supra note 65.
110. Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Mo. 1998).
111. "It may very well be that this result was unintentional, that Bean was merely
careless in naming Hazel as beneficiary of a set amount and then failing to decrease that
amount as the outstanding debt decreased." Id. at 295.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
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creditor as beneficiary solely as security for the debt is sufficient to indicate the
contrary intent of the insured. If the court had decided this case based upon the
parties' intentions, it would have been unnecessary to engage in a factual inquiry
to determine whether Hazel was named beneficiary solely as security for the debt
(although clearly he was designated for that reason), because the contrary intent
of the insured was express in the promissory note. The promissory note required
Bean to name Hazel as beneficiary of a life insurance policy in an "amount not
less than the unpaid balance of the promissory note and the accrued interest at
any time.',". This provision indicates that both Bean and Hazel only intended
for Hazel to recover from the insurance policy an amount necessary to satisfy the
debt, if Bean died before his indebtedness to Hazel was extinguished. Therefore,
based on the parties' intentions, Hazel would not have been allowed to escape
the express intent of the promissory note when Bean designated Hazel as

beneficiary and inadvertently failed to provide for a declining balance
arrangement. Further, because Bean only named Hazel beneficiary in the
amount of the original debt, on a policy that provided proceeds in excess of the
original debt,"' there was no evidence that Bean intended to provide Hazel with
an economic windfall. As evidenced by the promissory note, Hazel was named
beneficiary of the policy solely as security for Bean's indebtedness to him.
Thus, Hazel would only have been entitled to recover the amount of the
outstanding debt, plus interest, and the balance would have been held in
constructive trust for the benefit of the Estate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of the court to limit Hazel's recovery on Bean's life insurance
policy by inappropriately applying the rule against wager contracts produces
instability in the designation of beneficiaries in life insurance policies.
Dissatisfied heirs may be able to tempt courts into applying the rationale of the
present court by merely showing the existence of a creditor-debtor relationship,
even when it was not the insured's intent to limit the creditor's recovery." 4

112. Id. at291.
113. Bean named Hazel beneficiary in the amount of $120,000 on a policy that

provided $200,000 in death benefits. Id.
114.

In Forsterv. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 311 P.2d 700, 704 (Colo. 1957), the

insured took out and paid for a life insurance policy and later named a creditor as one of
the beneficiaries on the policy. The court did not limit the creditor's recovery because
the trial court found that the creditor was not named beneficiary as security for the debt.
Conversely, if the creditor was named beneficiary as security for the debt, the creditor's
recovery would have been limited to the amount of the debt. See also Wages v. Wages,
42 S.E.2d 481,486 (Ga. 1947). In Wages, the court held that an insured has an interest
in his own life and may name anyone as beneficiary, however, "where it appears as a
matter of fact that the policy is held by a creditor merely as security for a debt of the
for the
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When the insured purchases and maintains the policy, the insured's designation
of a beneficiary should be rebutted in only very limited circumstances, such as
the present case. Requiring a showing of a creditor-debtor relationship, plus
evidence of the insured's intent to limit the beneficiary's recovery to the amount
of the debt, would be sufficient to promote stability in the law and to give effect
to the insured's intent.
JOHN M. LIMBAUGH

balance to the legal representative of the debtor." Id. at 486. The court found sufficient
evidence to affirm the trial court's ruling that the insured did not name the creditor as
beneficiary solely as security for the debt, thus allowing the creditor full recovery on the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/5
insured's
policy. Id. at 487-88.
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